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ABSTRACT: The Brussels I Regulation’s re-foundation by the New Brussels I Regulation was 
thought to secure reciprocal trust on justice administration among Member States and to 
grant full access to justice for those who inhabit and circulate in its territory. In a Union 
characterized by circulation freedoms and an internal market existence, those principles 
justify a situation in which judgments ruled by a Member State’s court are automatically 
recognised and enforced, in other Member-State, except when the defendant evokes the rules 
on denial of judgments’ recognition and enforcement. There would not be judicial 
cooperation and integration’s prosecution without trust – trust must exist among Member 
States’ courts and it must be felt by EU citizens so they can acknowledge that EU is actively 
seeking to improve their life and working conditions. The European Commission made 
constructive efforts to promote an exequatur’s abolition, making recognition and 
enforcement proceedings on the New Brussels I Regulation simpler (it even proposed to 
remove the “public policy” clause, which was not accepted). It is necessary to analyse how 
the CJEU applies the rules on denial of judgments’ recognition and enforcement to perceive 
if the principle of an effective judicial protection is fulfilled under New Brussels I Regulation.  
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1. The role of mutual recognition and reciprocal trust principles under the Brussels 
I Regulation and  theNew Brussels I Regulation 
 
The Brussels I Regulation
1
 was the first normative instrument adopted to promote Judicial 
Cooperation in Civil Matters within European Union (EU) and, in that sense, to promote an 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice development. It appears as a forerunner instrument in 
the prosecution of the following primordial objectives: to secure better access to justice in 
Europe and to reinforce judgments‟ mutual recognition in that space.  
 
In fact, EU policies in civil matters will continue to be conducted based on those guiding 
principles, which also entail the exequatur‟s suppression, so a better, wider and simpler 
access to justice in cross-border litigations can be achieved. The Brussels I Regulation also 
made possible a simplification of judgments‟ recognition and enforcement, in the EU, when 
those were issued by other Member States‟ courts. This can be inferred from the reciprocal 
trust in justice administration among Member States key-principle proclamation, deduced 
from the Regulation‟s recitals.2 
 
In a Union characterized by fundamental circulation freedoms and the existence of an internal 
market, these principles justify the situation in which judgments set in a Member State are 
automatically recognized and enforced in another Member State, without needing any other  
procedure, except in those cases where the defendant evokes the rules on denial of 
judgments‟ recognition and enforcement. They also demand that it must be fast and effective. 





                                                          
1
 Regulation 44/2001, of  the Council, of 22 December 2000, on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters.  
 
2
 Cf. Brussels I Regulation‟s introducing recital 16. 
 
3
 Cf. Bruno Nascimbene,  « Le traite de Lisbonne et l‟espace judiciaire européen: le principe de confiance 
réciproque et de reconnaissance mutuelle», Revue des Affaires Européennes – Law & European Affairs, Burreau 
du depôt: Bruxelles X, Trimestriel/Quartely, 18
e





In this scenario, and having in mind the New Brussels I Regulation
4
 (which concluded the 
recast procedure of the Brussels I Regulation) it provides a closer observance of mutual trust 
through the complete abolition of the exequatur. In our opinion, this leads the way in the 
judicial cooperation in the field of civil matters, with the necessary reduction of  litigators‟ ( 
individuals or enterprises) expenses in cross-border litigations,
5
 assuring a more immediate 
observance, in a Member State, of judgments ruled in another Member State. The referred 
Regulation shall apply to all litigations presented after 10 January 2015.      
 
This matter is part of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice – in regards to Judicial 
Cooperation in Civil Matters – and it is guided by three major elements: «a better access to 
justice»; «judgments mutual recognition» and «a greater convergence in civil law domains».
 6
 
In this sense, reciprocal trust was described by the Council as the cornerstone in the treatment 
of judgements issued in different Member States. 
 
The mutual recognition principle gains particular importance in this area since it allows gaps‟ 
harmonization and approximation of Member State legislations, when these are not yet in a 
situation where they can do it by their own volition.
7
 On the other hand, the reciprocal trust 
principle is intrinsically related to mutual recognition.   
  
This is clear in Article 67(4) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU), where it is stated that «the Union shall facilitate access to justice, in particular 
through the principle of mutual recognition of judicial and extrajudicial decisions in civil 
matters». It was developed under Article 81(1), 1
st
 part of the TFEU, since it is stated that 
«the Union shall develop judicial cooperation in civil matters having cross-border 
implications, based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and  decisions in 
extrajudicial cases». Such cooperation may include, as it is shown in its 2
nd
 part, «the 
                                                          
4
 Regulation 1215/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 12 December 2012, on jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. 
 
5
 Cf. European Commission‟s Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council, on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast), 




 Cf. Bruno Nascimbene, Le traite de Lisbonne et l’espace judiciaire, 788 (translated freely). 
 
7
 Cf. Bruno Nascimbene, Le traite de Lisbonne et l’espace judiciaire, 788. 
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adoption of measures for the approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member 
States».  
 
Bearing this in mind, we could not consider that when the EU legislator only refers the 
mutual recognition principle, this means that the reciprocal trust principle is being excluded. 
In fact, reciprocal trust derives from the Brussels I and the New Brussels I Regulations‟ 
recitals but it also integrates the meaning and the scope of mutual recognition principle. It 





Reciprocal trust is, in this sense, the normative “component” that ensures the fundamental 
rights protection enshrined in the common constitutional traditions of all Member States 
(Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union – TEU), as it is provided by Article 67 of the 
TFUE. «Trust […] is presumed and is reinforced thanks to the integration pursued by the 
States, by the Community, by the Union».
9
 Reciprocal trust does not demand full and 
complete identification of situations and legislations, but rather an equivalent treatment 
(substantive and/or procedural) in a way that a judgment ruled by a Member State‟s authority 





The discussion concerning the EU‟s judicial common area is set around those two main 
principles. In this sense, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has ruled on 
judgments‟ recognition and enforcement and developed the several dimensions of the 






                                                          
8
 Cf. Bruno Nascimbene, Le traite de Lisbonne et l’espace judiciaire, 789 (translated freely). 
 
9
 Cf. Bruno Nascimbene, Le traite de Lisbonne et l’espace judiciaire, 789 (translated freely). 
 
10
 Cf. Article 2(e) of the New Brussels I Regulation concerning the meaning of «Member State addressed». 
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2. The role of CJEU case law in the principle of effective judicial protection 
construction in the field of judgments’ recognition and enforcement 
 
In the topic under discussion, it is relevant to remember that Articles 34 and 35 of the 
Brussels I Regulation outlines all exceptional situations in which judgments‟ recognition can 
be refused, when they were ruled in another Member State; Articles 34 and 35 of the Brussels 
I Regulation contain the list of exceptional situations that may operate the refusal to 
recognize a judgment given in another Member State. Article 45(1) provides that those 
requirements are applicable to judgments‟ enforcement refusals. 
 
In the light of the principle of effective judicial protection, preliminary rulings are usually 
related to the public policy clause or to the absolute default of appearance. These two refusal 
causes are referred in Article 34 (1) and (2) of the Brussels I Regulation. 
 
The public policy clause justifies the refusal of judgments‟ recognition and/or enforcement 
when that decision is clearly contrary to the addressed Member State‟s public order. 
 
On the other hand, there‟s an absolute default of appearance when the procedural act that 
initiated the judicial litigation in the Member State of origin – or its equivalent act – was not 
communicated to the defendant in sufficient time so the defendant could arrange for his 
defence. There is, however, an exception: even if there is this absolute default of appearance, 
it is possible that the refusal of recognition and/or enforcement is not going to be issued when 
the defendant failed to initiate proceedings to challenge the judgment, when it was possible 
for him to do so in the original Member State. 
 
The first CJEU case law which we are going to analyse is ASML,
11
 based on an Austrian 
court‟s preliminary ruling. In this case, ASML commenced proceedings, in the Netherlands, 
against SEMIS in order to convict the latter to pay a certain sum of money. SEMIS was, 
indeed, convicted to pay. However, in the referred process, SEMIS was cited to the act that 
initiated the judicial litigation about a week later from the date in which the act took place. 
SEMIS also was not notified about the final decision which stated its conviction.  
 
                                                          
11
 Cf. Judgment ASML, 14 December 2006, Case C-283/05. 
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Once questioned about the notion of «absolute default of appearance», the CJEU began its 
analysis by stating that, despite the fact that the Brussels I Regulation objectives are to 
establish the decisions‟ freedom of circulation among Member States in civil and commercial 
matters by simplifying its recognition and enforcement formalities so they can be faster and 
simpler, those goals cannot be achieved at the expense of weakening the defendant‟s rights. 
This conclusion is also stated in the Brussels I Regulation‟s recital 18.  
 
Considering the jurisprudential developments of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) case law, the CJEU remembered that defence rights derive from the right to an 
effective remedy and to a fair trial, which demands a concrete and adequate protection suited 
to guarantee that the defendant can exercise his rights effectively, as it derives from the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
 
Developing this effective judicial protection‟s dimension, the CJEU, demonstrated that the 
respect of the defendant rights when he is not able to appear in the origin Member State is 
guaranteed by a double control enshrined in the Brussels I Regulation: 
 
- the origin Member State‟s judge must suspend his decision while he is not sure  if the 
defendant had the opportunity to receive the act  which has initiated the litigation, on time to 
be able to properly present his defence, or when he is not sure that all the necessary measures 
were made to pursue that goal;  
 
- in the addressed Member State, if the defendant presents an appeal of the decision that 
recognises or enforces the judgment from the Member State of origin, the court  which will 
be deciding the appeal has to examine  if there are indeed grounds for  refusing  recognition 
and / or enforcement. 
 
 As in the case we are analysing, those situations in which the defendant was not aware of the 
decision‟s content the CJEU tells us that the defendant can only appeal a decision to which he 
was fully aware of. This is the case because it is only possible to present an effective appeal 
when the defendant knows the judgment grounds In fact, only then, can his defence rights be 




However, when the EU legislator added an exception to the refusal cause at the end of Article 
34(2), what he had in mind was to avoid a situation in which  the defendant could try to 
excuse himself from appealing in the Member State of origin, only acting in case of 
decisions‟ recognition/ enforcement in the requested Member State. And, it is worth noting 
that by introducing this exceptional demand there were no further requirements imposed on 
the defendant. In fact, this only reinforces the CJEU‟s interpretation that when the defendant 
could not know the content of the decision, he is not required to discover it by his own 
means.  
 
Therefore, the CJEU determined that the defendant would be able to appeal a judgment, as 
stated in Article 34.(2), in fine, when the defendant had been made aware of the content of the 
decision. Notwithstanding, it is important to clarify that, according to the CJEU, this 
notification does not have to entail more demanding formal characteristics than those verified 
for the citation of the act which initiated the litigation. 
 
Another relevant dimension, on this issue, comes from the Apostolides
12
 case.  The main 
litigation involved Apostolides in contention with the Orams couple and it concerned a 
property right. The Orams couple were convicted in default of appearance. The competent 
United Kingdom court (addressed Member State) declared the judgement‟s enforcement and 
the Orams couple appealed  this decision, invoking the public policy clause as the cause for 
the enforcement refusal.  
 
In this case, the CJEU remembered that it cannot define «public policy of a Member State». 
But it can, however, oversee the limits in which the addressed Member State‟s court can use 
this clause to refuse a judgment‟s recognition and/or enforcement, ruled by the origin 
Member State‟s court.  
 
The public policy clause can only be used when the decision‟s recognition/enforcement 
affects, in an inacceptable way, a fundamental principle of the addressed Member State. It 
must substantiate a manifest violation of an essential juridical rule or fundamental right of the 
addressed Member State‟s public order.  
 
                                                          
12
 Cf. Judgment Apostolides, 28 April 2009, Case C-420/07. 
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In this case, the mentioned court did not indicate any principle or fundamental right in its 
legal order which allowed for the application of that refusal cause. Therefore, the CJEU 
articulated the principle of effective judicial protection with another refusal cause, the public 
policy clause.   
 
There is another element which we can retain from the Trade Agency
13
 case law. This 
judgment was based on a Latvian preliminary ruling request. The Latvian court wanted to 
know if it was possible, for the addressed Member State‟s court, to inquire about the accuracy 
of the information enclosed in the certificate which accompanied the Member State of 
origin‟s decision and the evidence means presented by the defendant. The national judge 
specifically wanted to know,  if he had those powers since the defendant had pleaded that he 
was not cited to the act that initiated the judicial litigation (in the Member State of origin) but 
the certificate clearly stated that he was legally cited. 
 
The CJEU specified that the addressed Member State‟s judge can only make a formal control 
of the required documents to declare the judgment‟s enforcement, and does not have the 
power to control any legal or factual aspect of the litigation decided by the Member State of 
origin's court. As stated in the Brussels I Regulation, in no circumstances may a judgment 
given in a Member State be reviewed, as to its substance, in the addressed Member State.  
 
It is settled that the addressed Member State‟s judge has to check if the defendant was cited 
in order to evaluate the claimed refusal reason of recognition and/or enforcement of the 
decision.  Additionally, as it was said, it is the addressed Member State‟s judge who does this 
evaluation and assesses if the defendant had sufficient time to present his defence or to take 
the necessary steps to avoid a default of appearance.  
 
Therefore, the certificate which accompanies the decision cannot limit the range of 
appreciation for the addressed Member State‟s judge since there is no rule in the Brussels I 
Regulation that expressly forbids the addressed Member State‟s court to verify the accuracy 
of the certificate‟s information. The Regulation only prohibits a review as to the judgment‟s 
substance, which did not happen in this case. 
 
                                                          
13
 Cf.  Judgment Trade Agency, 6 September 2012, Case C-619/10. 
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And it is important to remember that the entity who issues that certificate might not 
correspond to the entity who had ruled the judgment. Consequently, the only information 
mentioned in that certificate concerns the date when the defendant was cited/ notified when 
he did not actively litigate in the procedure. In fact, other important information is left out, 
despite their useful nature for the addressed Member State‟s judge, such as: a) information 
that allows him to know if the defendant had the opportunity to actually know the litigation 
he was involved in; b) if the citation/notification was made on time; c) and if the defendant 
had the opportunity to exercise his defence rights. 
 
Therefore, presenting the certificate cannot limit the judge's powers from the addressed 
Member State because this would undermine the useful effect of the judge‟s control in order 
to secure the defendant‟s rights, not only in the Member State of origin, but also in the 
addressed Member-State.   
 
The importance of the Trade Agency case law is unquestionable because it entails a new look 
regarding the addressed Member State‟s judge powers (in the above mentioned situation). In 
fact, it recognises the judge‟s faculty to inquire about the coincidence of the declarations 
made in the certificate that accompanies the decision to be recognised/ enforced with the 
evidence presented by the defendant. With this conclusion, the CJEU further fortified the 
protection of defendant's rights. 
 
The CJEU recently considered this same subject in the Visser
14
 case, based on a German 
request for a preliminary ruling. In this case, the preliminary ruling was presented by the 
origin Member-State‟s court since the fundamental question was related to the decision‟s 
certification as an European Enforcement Order.  
 
The litigation concerned a decision issued in the defendant‟s absolute default of appearance– 
Visser – since there was no proof that he had actually known that a judicial action was being 
held against him because he was cited by edictal. Despite all the efforts made to determine 
the defendant‟s proper address, the court was unable to cite the defendant using  any other 
means of citation.     
 
                                                          
14
 Cf. Judgment Visser, 15 March 2012, Case C-292/10. 
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The CJEU tells us – and here is where the novelty of this case law resides! – that, despite the 
fact that all the Brussels I Regulation rules are aimed at giving the defendant all the necessary 
means to ensure his defence rights, their observance cannot compromise the right 
acknowledged to the plaintiff to have access to effective remedies before a court and to 
demand his rights.  
 
In this way, the CJEU shows the confrontation that can emerge between two different 
dimensions of the principle of effective judicial protection: on one hand, the right to a fair 
trial, which includes the defendant‟s defence rights, and on the other hand, the right of access 
to effective remedies before a court in order to guarantee that the plaintiff can demand his 
rights 
 
In consequence, and remembering its previous case law, the CJEU tells us that fundamental 
rights, such as respect for the defendant‟s defence rights, do not  emerge  as absolute 
prerogatives. They can be restricted as long as these restrictions correspond to general interest 
goals. However they cannot constitute, in the light of the pursued objectives, an unmeasured 
violation of that fundamental right.  
 
The CJEU had already declared its concern for avoiding situations of complete denial of 
justice that the plaintiff could face due to the impossibility of locating the defendant. This is, 
indeed, a true general interest goal.  
 
In spite of the defendant‟s edictal citation substantially reducing his defence rights, 
preventing judicial litigation to continue would impose a major restriction on the plaintiff 
„right to effective remedies before a court. This strong protection of the plaintiff is justifiable 
because the defendant still has the possibility to present an appeal in the court of origin 
against the decision that convicted him. Afterwards he can even, present an appeal to the 
addressed court to avoid the judgement‟s recognition and/or enforcement, as stated in Article 
34(2) of the Brussels I Regulation. As for the plaintiff, if it was not for the protection 
described above he would be prevented from reacting in any other way.   
 
The CJEU understood that a decision in default is possible, based on edictal citation as long 
as the competent court is certain that all the necessary diligences to find the defendant were 
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pursued before ruling its final decision. Those necessary diligences are subjected to 
transparency and good faith principles.  
 
On the other hand, this decision must always be submitted to a recognition/enforcement 
request in the addressed Member State because this is the only way the defendant‟s defence 
rights can be guaranteed since he has the chance of changeling the decision‟s 
recognition/enforcement. Therefore, the CJEU understood that, in similar cases, the European 
Enforcement Order shall not be issued.  
  
3. Exequatur’s suppression: an evolution marked by false starts? 
 
Exequatur‟s suppression implies that an origin decision is recognised and enforced, in the 
addressed Member State, in the same conditions that this State would recognise and enforce a 
decision issued by one of its courts – Articles 33(1) of the Brussels I Regulation and 36(1) of 
the New Brussels I Regulation. Alternatively, resorting to a similar concept, the decision 
must be accepted as it would be if it had been issued by the courts of the addressed Member 
State (recital 16 of the Brussels I Regulation and recital 26 of the New Brussels I Regulation). 
New Brussels I Regulation enshrines, in a more obvious way, the «principle of assimilation 





Having in mind the Green Paper‟s introduction on the review of the Brussels I Regulation,16 
we can identify that the exequatur‟s suppression was needed since «it is difficult to justify, in 
an internal market without frontiers, the fact that citizens and businesses have to undergo the 
expenses in terms of costs and time to assert their rights abroad [even if] applications for 
declarations of enforceability are almost always successful and recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments is very rarely refused».
17
 Nevertheless, the same Green Paper reminded 
that the «abolition of the exequatur should, however, be accompanied by the necessary 
                                                          
15
 Cf. Arnaud Nuyts, « La refonte du règlement Bruxelles I», Revue critique de droit international prive, 1, 
Trimestrielle, Tome 102, Dalloz, Janvier/ Mars (2013): 23 (translated freely). 
 
16
 Cf. Green Paper on the review and application of the Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction, recognition and 









 as can be read from our case law analysis concerning the principle of effective 
judicial protection.  
 
The Exequatur‟s suppression was the European Commission's (EC) “war-horse” since its 
purpose was to show European citizens that «Europe is active and materially improves their 
life and working conditions».
19
 The EC intended to promote reciprocal trust among Member 
States in a more effective way and reduce the costs associated with cross-border litigations. 
In fact, the expression «reciprocal trust» appears in the recital 26 of the New Brussels I 
Regulation, in its French version, leaving the commonly used expression «mutual trust» 
aside, as it appears in the English version. 
 
Many authors question if that reference was a translation mistake and, if that was the case, 
whether that error resulted from the French or from the English
20
 version. This dissidence‟s 
importance is questionable, especially when it is unanimously recognized among the legal 
doctrine that there is a reciprocal trust principle. In any case, the use of the expression 
«reciprocal trust» in the French version embodied the hope that the accurate expression was 
adopted, at least in one of the Regulation‟s official versions.   
 
The EC Regulation proposal detected four main gaps, among which we would like to 
underline the following one (since it clearly reflects the importance of the present issue): «the 
procedure for recognition and enforcement of a judgment in another Member State 
("exequatur") remains an obstacle to the free circulation of judgments which entails 
unnecessary costs and delays for the parties involved and deters companies and citizens from 




                                                          
18
 Cf. Green Paper on the review and application of the Regulation 44/2001, 2.  
 
19
 Cf. Catherine Kessedjian, «Commentaire de la refonte du règlement n.º 44/2001», RTDeur – Revue 
Trimestrielle de droit européen, n.º 1, Dalloz, Janvier/Mars (2011): 128 (translated freely). 
 
20
 In the Regulation‟s Portuguese version we can also find the correspondent expression «confiança mutua», 
which literal translation corresponds to the English expression «mutual trust» rather than to the one 
contemplated in the French version - «reciprocal trust». 
 
21





Member States agreed that a true judgments‟ freedom of circulation should be created.22 But, 
in order to secure the exequatur‟s suppression effectiveness, it is necessary that fundamental 
rights, namely the defendant's right to a fair trial and other defence rights, are protected as 
provided in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 





The main reasons concerning refusal of recognition and enforcement of judgments were 
maintained as provided in Articles 34 and 45(1) of the Brussels I Regulation. However, 
concerning the EC proposal, there was an absolute novelty: the public policy clause was 
going to disappear as a reason of recognition and enforcement refusal. The EC justified this 
option stating that «the time and costs of the exequatur procedure will be saved while the 




However, this EC proposal was understood as aiming at something greater than what could 
be achieved at the time since, as Catherine Kessedjian states, removing the public policy 
clause goes further than the original law, in regards to the internal market.
25
 The CJEU 
recently had the opportunity to elaborate on this subject in the Liga Portuguesa de Futebol 
Profissional and Bwin Internacional
26
 case. In fact, the public policy clause was maintained 
in Article 45(1)(a) of the New Brussels I Regulation.  
 
This proposal was ambitious and even if for some legal doctrine, it appeared as 
«premature»:
27
 The Brussels I Regulation created mechanisms that actually work and, in the 
                                                          
22




 Cf. European Commission‟s Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council, on 
jurisdiction, 5. In fact, this document states that «views differed on the extent of such safeguards and on the 
place where such safeguards should be available (Member State of enforcement or Member State of origin)». 
 
24




 Cf.  Catherine Kessedjian, Commentaire de la refonte du règlement n.º 44/2001, 129. 
 
26








end, there were not as many controversial topics as one might think. In this sense, there are 
some authors who understand that the EC proposal, especially concerning the public policy 
clause exclusion, was pursuing a political agenda rather than the Regulation‟s actual 
functional operability – «in practice, the Regulation works well and the need of recast derives 
more of political choices made by the Commission, not all of them justified, such as […] in 
the total suppression of the public policy control in decisions‟ enforcement».28  
 
From the case law analysis, we can conclude that the public policy clause has been used, by 
the defendant, when he requests for the denial of the decision‟s recognition and/or 
enforcement, even when the proper requirements are not filled. Defendants always use the 
denial cause, almost as an alternative plea to the one that the situation relates to. The public 
policy clause was rarely applied by national courts.
29
  These proposals in the line with others 
presented by the EC, was not fully accepted because «they were too radical to a large number 







The CJEU has a prevailing role in keeping the balance between the maturation of the 
reciprocal trust on justice administration among Member States and the strict observance of 
the principle of effective judicial protection in all its dimensions.   
 
The CJEU has acknowledged the recognition and the enforcement of other Member States 
decisions when this does not entail a complete and unbearable violation of the fair trial rights 
accorded to the defendant or the right to effective remedy before a court to be given to the 
plaintiff.  
 
                                                          
28
 Cf. Catherine Kessedjian, «Commentaire de la refonte du règlement n.º 44/2001», 130 (translated freely). 
 
29
 Cf. Peter Arnt Nielsen, «The new Brussels I Regulation», Common Market Law Review, Vol. 50, Number 2, 
50th Anniversary, Wolters Kluwer Law & Business April (2013): 527; B. Hess, «The Brussels I Regulation: 
Recent case law of the Court of Justice and the Commission‟s proposed recast, Common Market Law Review, 
Vol. 49, Number 3, Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, June (2012): 1103-1105. 
 
30
 Cf. Peter Arnt Nielsen, «The new Brussels I Regulation», 527 (translated freely). 
161 
 
Despite the fact that the Brussels I Regulation and the New Brussels I Regulation expressly 
refer, in their recitals, to the right to a fair trial, the CJEU does not forget the other 
dimensions of the principle of effective judicial protection, proclaiming the importance of the 
right to an effective remedy before a court when, in a particular case, this can be damaged if 
the defence rights are pursued blindly.   
 
In a context where the New Brussels I Regulation entirely suppresses the exequatur, it was 
the principle of effective judicial protection that justified maintaining all the denial reasons to 
decisions‟ recognition and/or enforcement in the addressed Member-State.31 
 
The principle of effective judicial protection is inseparable from judicial cooperation in civil 
and commercial matters. That principle simultaneously softens and promotes the referred 
judicial cooperation, and in an era where the reciprocal trust paradigm is defined mostly by 
the exequatur‟s suppression, the CJEU has a defining role in declaring and proclaiming the 
principle of effective judicial protection as a general principle of EU law.  
                                                          
 
31
 Cf. Peter Arnt Nielsen, «The new Brussels I Regulation», 527. 
